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Introduction
Humans have evolved to live within large and complex 
social systems and they are exceptional in the extent to 
which they engage in cooperative exchange [1, 2]. Indeed, 
in the modern world, people often spend significant 
amounts of time interacting with others that are not well 
known to them. In the absence of information about a 
prospective social partner, what cues guide individuals to 
select certain social partners over others? One social cue 
that can influence social assortment is the perceived level 
of similarity to the self. Social psychological research has 
demonstrated that adults and adolescents preferentially 
engage in acts of cooperation and support towards those 
who they consider to be “like them” [3]. For example, adults 
prefer individuals they perceive to be similar to themselves 
in terms of demographics, personal beliefs and attitudes, 
or physical appearance [4–8].
Perhaps more strikingly, even without any prior interac-
tion experiences or specific knowledge about the other, 
adults show consistent tendencies to prefer those with 
whom they share even a slight, seemingly arbitrary feature 
that can serve as the basis for social categorization. Such 
minimal similarities are related to ingroup favoritism, i.e. 
the tendency to identify with social groups and to favor 
members of one’s own group (the “ingroup”) over those of 
a different group (the “outgroup”). Researchers coined the 
term ‘minimal group phenomenon’ following Henri Tajfel’s 
development of a study paradigm to test the emergence 
of intergroup biases [9, 10]. In minimal group research, 
abstract shared markers based on, for example, simple 
preferences are used to define two contrasting social 
groups and various behavioral responses (i.e. evaluations 
of others, resource allocation or helping) are measured. In 
early work using this paradigm, participants were grouped 
based on similar, seemingly arbitrary preferences (such as 
a preference for Kandinsky over Klee paintings) or even 
by random assignment (e.g. a coin toss). Remarkably, 
even entirely meaningless groupings were sufficient to 
elicit favoritism for ingroup members, a robust finding 
across a variety of measures (see [11] for a meta-analytic 
review).
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One key advantage of the minimal group paradigm is 
that it allows us to measure intergroup preferences in 
any given cultural context in the absence of confounding 
variables such as familiarity or pre-existing cultural stereo-
types about the groups in question. This is important as 
it allows us to assess when merely belonging to a group 
begins to influence children’s intergroup cognition. We 
know that the origins of intergroup preferences appear 
very early in development. For example, even infants 
prefer individuals who speak their native language [12]. 
However, these early preferences may be driven by famili-
arity rather than by an understanding of how different 
individuals relate to the self.
Research with somewhat older children has shown 
that, at least by five years of age, children self-stereotype, 
i.e. conceive of the self in group-relevant terms [13]. 
Furthermore, around the same age children are sensitive to 
minimal group membership and show a tendency to pre-
fer previously unfamiliar and meaningless (i.e. “minimal”) 
groups [14–16]. However, published findings in younger 
children have so far been largely negative. Fawcett and 
Markson [17] report that while 3-year-olds prefer a pup-
pet playmate with physical appearance similar to their 
own in terms of hair color, they do not do so based on 
an arbitrary group marker (stickers assigned by the experi-
menter). Further, in a follow-up experiment the authors 
found that only the stable trait of similar hair color, but 
not the transient trait of a matching shirt color triggered 
initial liking in 3-year-olds ([17], Experiment 1b). In a lab-
oratory demonstration Dunham and colleagues [14, 15] 
further found that 5- and 6-year olds, but not 3-year-olds, 
favored unfamiliar peers wearing a same-color group shirt 
as measured by their implicit attitudes, behavioral attribu-
tion, and expectation of reciprocity. Consistent with this, a 
recent study by Plötner and colleagues [18] revealed that 
while 3-year-olds did not reliably differ in their behavior, 
5-year-olds preferentially came to help those who shared 
their own minimal group membership. Other work has 
demonstrated robust minimal group biases around age 
5, including sensitivity to such aspects as within-group 
fairness norms and loyalty [19, 20], reputation manage-
ment [21], or positive affect [15].
Thus, five years is often cited as an important period 
for the development of intergroup cognition and behav-
ior [22, 23]. While past research is consistent with the 
possibility that sensitivity to minimal group cues does 
not emerge until around age 5, it is possible that even 
younger children will show sensitivity to the minimal 
group paradigm under the right circumstances, and in 
particular when the experimental paradigm makes the 
group distinction clearer or more salient. If so, this would 
lead us to reevaluate the age at which children first show 
biased group-mindedness and thus reconsider the social 
contexts necessary for the development of intergroup 
cognition and behavior.
The objective of the current study was to investigate 
the effects of minimal group membership in children as 
young as three years old on a range of explicit attitude 
measures. Specifically, we investigated the consequences 
of a random color group assignment, and whether this 
type of minimal group membership affects explicit social 
preferences.
A central goal was to adjudicate between two possible 
interpretations for prior failures to observe minimal group 
preferences in early preschoolers. One possibility is that 
the mechanism(s) underlying such preferences in older 
children is not yet present in younger children. Another 
possibility is that, while the mechanism(s) itself is in place, 
younger children do not as reliably attend to, or otherwise 
concern themselves with, group boundaries such that the 
mechanism(s), while operative, is not as readily engaged. 
In the latter case, but not the former case, a paradigm that 
draws additional attention to group boundaries and the 
social relevance of group membership (while still avoiding 
attaching any evaluative meaning to the groups) might 
lead to the emergence of minimal group preferences in 
younger children.
In a within-participant design, children were randomly 
assigned to either the green or the orange group [14]. 
Shared visual group markers and explicit group labels 
were used to enhance the perceptual salience of group 
membership. In a forced-choice manner, children were 
then asked to select their preferred choice from pictures 
contrasting in- and outgroup targets; this categorization 
component has not generally been used in past studies 
of this sort, and served to call additional attention to the 
group boundary prior to the primary dependent meas-
ures [24]. We employed the following measures: First, we 
assessed participant’s explicit attitudes (“Who do you like 
better?”). Second, we determined whether behaviors of 
either positive or neutral behaviors were attributed dif-
ferently to in- and outgroup targets (“Who made cookies 
for their friends?”). In a third task, we further measured 
whether young children expected more similar prefer-
ences between ingroup members. (“You like vanilla, which 
of these kids also likes vanilla?”). Using this range of 
dependent measures enabled us to examine the breadth 
of explicit minimal group attitudes in young preschoolers.
Materials and Methods
Participants
The 48 participants (22 female) were primarily 3-year-old 
children but also included nine older 4-year-olds (mean 
age = 3.7; range from min = 3;1 to max = 4;8 years). The 
reason we had included 4-year-olds is that we had decided 
on the sample size prior to data collection. During data 
collection it became apparent that to reach this sample 
size we would need to include a few 4-year-olds. Children 
were recruited from laboratory maintained databases at 
Princeton and Yale University, were primarily middle-class 
and of diverse ethnic backgrounds (55% European Ameri-
can, 16% Indian American, 8% African American, 6% 
Asian American, 6% Hispanic), and were tested in their 
local preschools. Written informed parental consent was 
ensured in advance of all testing. All research reported 
here was approved by the respective Institutional Review 
Boards at Princeton and Yale University.
An additional 11 children (4 female) were tested but 
excluded from the final sample, one due to an experi-
menter error and the others because they failed to recall 
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which group they had been assigned to at the end of the 
study (see procedure details below).
Materials
For the minimal group manipulation materials were 
sets of orange and green group markers consisting of 
armbands, stickers, and scarves. To randomly assign the 
participating children to one of the two color groups, a 
small bucket containing green and orange plastic chips 
was used. Test stimuli were drawings of children matching 
the participant in gender and wearing orange and green 
group markers (see S2 Fig for an example). Stimuli were 
presented in counterbalanced order across participants 
and trials were presented on a 13-inch laptop screen.
Procedure
All participants were tested individually by one of two 
research assistants who recorded their responses on a 
laptop. The overall study procedure took approximately 
20 minutes and included a minimal group assignment 
procedure, followed by three different tasks of group affil-
iation, and ended with a manipulation check.
For the minimal group assignment, participants first 
heard stories about two children from different groups 
who had each “blindly” drawn a colored coin from a 
bucket which determined their color group membership. 
Next, participants were asked to likewise draw a coin with-
out looking from a bucket containing multiple orange and 
green coins. Depending on the color of the coin selected, 
the experimenter (E) told the child that within this game 
context he or she would be assigned to the green (n = 22) 
or orange (n = 26) group. To make membership salient, 
children were given three group markers to put on, an 
armband, a sticker, and a scarf in their respective group 
color, and were told they would now view other children 
in the green and orange groups on the computer. To fur-
ther reinforce the salience of the groups, children looked 
at several drawings of children wearing either green or 
orange group markers (armbands, stickers, and scarves). 
On each round, E asked the participant which color group 
the presented individuals belonged to. If children failed 
to ascribe the correct group membership, E guided them 
towards the correct answer, e.g. by pointing out the colors 
of the respective group markers. The minimal group 
induction ended once children had correctly identified 
group membership without any help from E on four con-
secutive rounds (two per color group). Children were then 
taken through the group affiliation measures described 
in the next section. At the completion of the study, E 
announced the end of the game, assisted the child in tak-
ing off their group markers. Finally, a research assistant 
casually approached the child, asked them whether they 
did have a fun time and, as a manipulation check, what 
color group the child had belonged to in the game.
Measures
The following group affiliation measures were undertaken 
in counterbalanced order.
Explicit Attitude. Children were told that they were 
going to look at several rounds of pictures of peers on the 
screen and that they had to point at which child they liked 
better. Five successive trials were presented. On each trial, 
two stimuli, one belonging to the participant’s ingroup and 
the other to the participant’s outgroup, appeared next to 
each other and children were asked to point at their favorite.
Shared Preference. On each of the five trials, children 
were first presented, on computer, with vignettes showing 
a pair of objects belonging to the same category, e.g. a pet 
animal (cat vs. dog) or a food type (vanilla vs. chocolate ice 
cream) and asked to point out which one they liked better. 
On the next screen, the child’s preferred choice appeared 
in the center juxtaposed with a stimuli pair depicting an 
ingroup and outgroup member, respectively. While point-
ing at the two options E was asking, “So you like (cats) 
better. Who do you think also likes (cats) better?”. Again 
participants were asked to indicate their choice by point-
ing at one of the two individuals.
Behavioral Attribution. Children were told that they 
would hear “about something that somebody did”, and 
their job was to decide who had done it. On each trial, a 
short behavior was described and pictured on the com-
puter, with either positive or neutral valence (five each). 
Positive items included questions like “Who made cookies 
for all their friends?” and neutral items included questions 
like “Who drove to school this morning?” This distinction 
allowed us to explore whether the valence of the described 
behavior predicted children’s ingroup attributions. We 
did not include items of negative valence because pre-
vious work suggests that outgroup negativity develops 
later than ingroup positivity and that negatively valenced 
items of this sort do not produce differential responding 
by group even in 5-year-olds [14, 22, 25]. Next, children 
saw a pair of targets, contrasting group color (orange vs. 
green) and were asked to point to their choice.
Additionally, we tested a fourth measure that we had 
devised as a novel approach to examine intergroup atti-
tudes via spatial distance assessment [26]. More precisely, 
we employed a task where participants were to actively 
arrange target stimuli on a magnetic whiteboard and we 
recorded the outcomes via digital photographs, with the 
hope of measuring whether children placed an avatar rep-
resenting the self nearer to other members of the ingroup 
versus the outgroup. However, technical issues of meas-
urement and image quality prevented accurate coding of 
the whiteboard images. Hence, we do not consider this 
measure further.
Statistical analysis
Participants completed three tasks (Explicit Attitude, 
Shared Preference, Behavioral Attribution), with multiple 
trials per task. We treated trial-level data as a repeated 
measure and analyzed the fraction of trials in which chil-
dren favored the ingroup. Our primary analysis focused on 
whether choices favored the ingroup target and whether 
choices differed as a function of task; a secondary analy-
sis focused on whether children’s preferences varied as a 
function of age (using age correlations computed sepa-
rately for each task).
Within our data analysis we employed non-parametric 
tests including unequal variance t-tests based on rank 
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transformations of the data [27–29]. We used exact tests 
throughout [28, 30] or, in the case of rank correlations, 
p-values estimated from 10000 permutations. All reported 
p-values are two-tailed. Analyses were performed using R 
3.1.0 [31], including the R packages exactRankTests [32], 
gtools [33], coin [34], and ggplot2 [35].
To ensure that our experimental manipulation was 
equally effective among participants, we excluded the 
responses of ten out of 59 children (17%, 3 female, mean 
age = 3.5; range from min = 3;1 to max = 3;8 years) that 
failed to correctly recall at the end of the study which 
group they had been assigned to. The rationale for this 
pre-planned exclusion was that if a child failed to encode 
their group membership at all they would not be capa-
ble of manifesting an intergroup preference. Additionally, 
we did not include the responses of one child that did 
not complete the post-test manipulation check due to 
an experimenter error. However, we note that including 
these children in our analysis does not alter our primary 
conclusions (S1 Fig).
Results
Preliminary analyses revealed no differences with regard 
to participant gender or the randomly assigned ingroup 
color, so we collapsed across these factors in all subse-
quent analyses. We further note that restricting our analy-
sis to only 3-year-olds yields similar results.
There was an overall difference in responses as a function of 
test task (Explicit Attitude, Shared Preference, or Behavioral 
Attribution; Friedman χ2 = 8.71, df = 2, p = 0.013). We had 
no prior prediction regarding whether the different meas-
ures would elicit different behaviors in our participants, 
but visual inspection of the data (see Fig. 1) suggested this 
effect was driven by higher frequencies of ingroup choices 
in the Explicit Attitude and Shared Preference tasks, but 
not in the Behavioral Attribution task. Pairwise compari-
sons confirmed that children chose the ingroup targets sig-
nificantly more frequently in the Shared Preferences and 
Explicit Attitude tasks than in the Behavioral Attribution 
trials (exact Wilcoxon tests: T+SharedPref = 556.5; N = 39 (9 ties), 
p = 0.019, r = 0.40 & T+ExpAtt = 557.5; N = 39 (9 ties), p = 0.018, 
r = 0.37). Moreover, children opted for the ingroup tar-
gets in similar ways on the former two measures (exact 
Wilcoxon test: T+ = 355, N = 34 (14 ties), p = 0.33; Fig. 1). 
Given the diverging results across tasks, we now report 
results for each task considered independently.
Explicit Attitude
Children expressed greater liking for members of their 
own minimal group and opted for the ingroup over the 
outgroup target in a median of 60% of trials. Crucially, 
the fraction of ingroup choices was significantly higher 
than 0.5, which would be expected by chance distribution 
(Exact Wilcoxon signed rank test: T+ = 844, N = 47, p = 
0.002). This minimal group preference was not correlated 
with age (Spearman’s rank correlation: rS = 0.073, N = 47, 
p = 0.621) suggesting that even the younger children in 
the sample showed ingroup preference.
Figure 1: Response distribution demonstrating minimal group preferences in 3-year-olds. The box-and-whisker 
plots show children’s responses across the three administered group affiliation measures. The boxes indicate the first 
and fourth quartiles. The solid lines inside the boxes represent the medians. The dashed lines capture the location 
of extreme values, with the exception of outliers (shown as circles) that exceeded the inter-quartile distance by more 
than 1.5. The horizontal, red dashed line indicates the chance level (50%).
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Shared Preferences
Children extended their own preferences to members of 
their own minimal group. More specifically, in a median 
of 60% of trials children ascribed similar preferences as 
their own to those individuals belonging to the same color 
group rather than to those individuals belonging to the 
other color group, a figure that exceeds chance expecta-
tion (Exact Wilcoxon signed rank test: T+ = 981, N = 48, 
p = 0.001). There was a trend for this effect to decrease 
with age but this correlation failed to reach statistical sig-
nificance (Spearman’s rank correlation: rS = -0.269, N = 48, 
p = 0.065).
Behavioral Attribution
We found no evidence of biased behavioral attribution on 
the basis of minimal group membership. Children made 
ingroup-favoring attributions in a median of 50% of trials, 
which is chance performance. There was no relationship 
between age and biased behavioral attribution (Spear-
man’s rank correlation: rS = -0.170, N = 47, p = 0.259). 
Further, there was no effect of group membership when 
examining positive and neutral items separately, (Mdnpos = 
0.60, Mdnneut = 0.60; exact Wilcoxon test: T
+ = 282, N = 29 
(18 ties), p = 0.166).
Discussion
In the current study, we investigated whether random 
assignment to minimal social groups elicits biased prefer-
ences for ingroup members in 3- and 4-year-old children. 
Like older children, these young children explicitly prefer 
members of their own group. This shows that the minimal 
group paradigm exerts an influence over preferences con-
siderably earlier in development than previously thought. 
Previous research has not found minimal group effects in 
children younger than around age 5 [14, 15, 18].
The children in our study estimated that ingroup mem-
bers will be more similar to themselves in their prefer-
ences thus extending superficial similarities based on 
arbitrary and randomly chosen markers to psychological 
traits. This result might be considered a simple form of 
group identification, in which children form the expec-
tation that they are more likely to be similar to ingroup 
members than outgroup members [3]; it can also be inter-
preted as a form of category-based induction in which 
children assume that, if one known exemplar of the social 
category has a particular property (i.e. the child herself), 
that property can be extended to other members of the 
same category (i.e. the ingroup).
Interestingly, these same younger children do not attrib-
ute more positive (or, for that matter, neutral) behaviors 
to the ingroup. This suggests an interesting developmen-
tal change. Older children in Dunham et al. (2011), at least 
in experiment 2, did not show this bias [14]. This differ-
ence between the measures points to the importance of 
using multiple dependent measures and investigating, in 
a more fine-grained way, the nature of intergroup biases at 
different ages. Future work should aim to disentangle the 
various range and magnitudes of biases in younger chil-
dren. More broadly, however, the weaker results with this 
measure are interesting: children manifest preferences for 
members of their minimal ingroup but do not appear to 
reliably use those preferences to make inferences about 
the unobserved behavior of ingroup members. It is pos-
sible that doing so requires a subsequent inferential step, 
for example reasoning that positive behavior is more con-
sistent with how a preferred ingroup member will behave, 
and this subsequent step is not readily made in children 
this young. The lack of an effect on this measure is in 
another sense reassuring, however: Children did not have 
a simple tendency to opt for the ingroup on all measures, 
i.e. they did not mindlessly choose the ingroup on all tasks 
or simply link the ingroup with positive things on all tasks 
(as could come about, for example, as a result of experi-
menter expectancy effects). Rather the group distinction 
was meaningful to children when judging preference and 
similarity but not when judging behavior.
A few limitations and uncertainties should be acknowl-
edged. First, there was a relatively high failure rate (17%) 
in encoding ones own group membership, especially in 
our younger participants. Even with our attempt to ramp 
up salience of the group manipulation, a modest propor-
tion of our participants thus seemed not to consider group 
membership particularly relevant. Future work could 
fruitfully explore the sorts of cues that might enhance 
the salience of group membership for younger chil-
dren. Second, while our work (and other minimal group 
research with children) assumes that children construe 
their group assignment as random due to the random 
process that determined membership, it is possible that 
children imbue the procedure with greater meaning, e.g. 
via teleological forms of reasoning that are characteristic 
of this age range [36]. If so, part of the power of minimal 
groupings for children could be a result of thinking that 
the group assignment was revelatory rather than random, 
i.e. that it revealed something about their nature. More 
work would be necessary to explore this possibility.
Past research with children in a similar age range and 
using similar paradigms has failed to reveal evidence of 
minimal group preferences in children [14, 15, 18]. Why 
are our results different? Note that there are at least two 
reasons younger children might not show minimal group 
preferences. First, they might simply not yet possess the 
socio-cognitive tendency to affiliate with novel social 
groups. Second, they might possess any such tendency 
but not employ it as rapidly or flexibly in the face of “mini-
mal” grouping cues. We were particularly interested in 
ruling in or ruling out the latter hypothesis. We therefore 
took pains to increase the salience of the group bound-
ary by employing and emphasizing multiple cues to group 
membership (an armband, a sticker, and a scarf) and by 
including a categorization task in which children actively 
employed the groups to classify social targets prior to 
completing the dependent measures. By contrast, most 
past studies have used a single cue and have not asked 
children to actively employ the category prior to attitude 
assessment [14, 15]. For example, in one past study that 
found minimal group preference in 6-yr-olds but not in 
3-yr-olds [15], children were assigned to groups based on 
a single cue (shirt color) and then proceeded directly to 
the dependent measures. Our results suggest that rather 
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than lacking the cognitive capacities to affiliate rapidly 
with novel social groups, younger children were simply 
less attentive to, or concerned with, the social groups. Put 
differently, that manipulation may have been too weak 
to activate automatic ingroup preference in the younger 
age group. However, this still leaves open questions con-
cerning what our salience manipulation actually accom-
plished. For example, did it simply heighten attention to 
the group boundaries themselves, or did it provide a socio-
cultural cue concerning the importance of the group in 
the context of the study? The present work is unable to 
speak to these possibilities.
Taken together, our findings extend previous minimal-
group research and establish that biased preferences 
based on minimal cues of group membership are present 
at least by the age of three. Our findings thus provide evi-
dence that, from early in development, humans are sensi-
tive to clearly marked and contextually prominent cues 
that demarcate social categories. Soon after such cues 
have been brought to children’s attention they begin 
to guide social preferences and inferences about shared 
traits. While there appears to be age-related change in 
the extent to which children are sensitive to subtle cues 
that demarcate social groups, the underlying tendency 
to prefer such groups once they have been made salient 
appears to be relatively continuous from age 3 onward. 
An important project for future work will be to connect 
this finding to infant research, which has suggested that 
by the end of the first year of life infants prefer others 
who share their social preferences, but not others who 
share an externally assigned property with them [37]. 
Based on the present work, a fascinating question 
becomes whether that externally assigned property could 
begin to generate social preferences if it was rendered 
more salient or socially relevant, or if infants were given 
more experience with it.
Preferences based on minimal cues indicating a circle of 
potentially similar others provide a strong guide to social 
assortment, especially when any other useful information 
about the potential interaction partner is missing. This 
early-emerging aspect of human psychology appears to be 
a key ingredient to the more complex forms of intergroup 
reasoning that emerge later in life.
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